The Belgian Interfederal Screening Committee, a body tasked with ensuring that major investments by foreign, non-European organizations do not lead to geopolitical surprises, has decided to block the acquisition of the Ostend-based helicopter operator Noordzee Helikopters Vlaanderen (NHV) by a Chinese investor.
These concerns relate to “risks to national security, Belgium’s strategic interests, and possible links to the defense sector,” says Minister of Economy David Clarinval (MR).
However, the decision must also be viewed against the backdrop of a much broader European shift in which the EU is pursuing a strategy of “de-risking” its relationship with China in crucial sectors such as green energy and critical infrastructure.
Detailed data and logistical vulnerabilities
The plan was for NHV, with 400 employees and about 30 helicopters, one of the largest Belgian companies in the field of transporting personnel and materials to offshore wind farms and oil and gas platforms, to be acquired by the Irish company GD Helicopter Finance (GDHF).
That company is a subsidiary of the Chinese aviation company GDAT Group, which already operates a fleet of about 100 European Airbus and Leonardo helicopters in China.
Consequently, whoever operates helicopter flights to such wind farms not only has physical access to this infrastructure but also has detailed data on the locations, the condition of the installations, and the logistical vulnerabilities of the wind farms.
Link with Defense
In addition to access to critical offshore infrastructure – the North Sea is an important power plant for Belgium and a crucial pillar of the European energy transition – there is another important factor at play. Last year, the Belgian Ministry of Defense purchased 20 new Airbus H145M helicopters, and Airbus selected NHV as a subcontractor to maintain that fleet.
Given that both the acquisition and the maintenance contract had gone through, a Chinese-controlled company would have been responsible for maintaining the new Belgian military helicopters. Sources within Defense called that “a bridge too far” – namely, allowing China to have insight into the Belgian air systems.
Now that the acquisition itself has been blocked, NHV – which has been owned by the French investment firm Ardian since 2013 – can once again compete for that subcontract with Airbus. In contrast, its bid had previously been put on hold as a precautionary measure when the Chinese interest in acquiring the company became public.
Plus: NHV already has a defense pedigree. It won a German Bundeswehr contract to provide and maintain three H145S for Special Forces pilot training at Laupheim, with NHV responsible for maintenance, material supply, and airworthiness. NHV itself said at the time that its Ostend facility would support those military operations.
“Entirely exceptional”
According to Clarinval’s office, this is the first time in 3 years that the government has blocked such an investment. It therefore calls the decision “entirely exceptional.”
At first glance, it makes sense that a foreign party would want to invest in NHV: it is a healthy company with a strong position in the growing offshore wind market. However, the blocking of the acquisition goes beyond China’s specific interest in purely financial gain.
First and foremost, China’s National Intelligence Law has been in effect since 2017. This law requires all Chinese organizations and citizens to cooperate with intelligence agencies upon request. European governments are rightly concerned about this: in theory, a Chinese company can never refuse to pass on data to Beijing, even if it is based in Ostend.
The more Chinese companies are intertwined with Europe’s energy transition, the more difficult it becomes for Europe to impose sanctions or take measures against China, though in the event of an escalation, for example, regarding Taiwan.
After all, we must not forget that China is the world leader in the production of solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries. By acquiring NHV, China would gain direct control over a crucial link in the construction and maintenance of European wind farms.
Politicization of normal trade from China’s point of view
If you look at the situation from Beijing’s perspective, China naturally sees it differently. China views this as discrimination, protectionism, and the politicization of normal trade.
When an American, Japanese, or European company acquires a Belgian company, there’s rarely a problem. But as soon as a Chinese company – or a company with Chinese capital – comes knocking, alarm bells start ringing. Beijing views this as the stigmatization of Chinese companies under the guise of “national security,” which, in their view, is part of the West’s spoiled “Cold War mentality.”
Furthermore, China points out that Europe is in a great hurry to make the green energy transition and that European countries often face high costs and shortages of capital or expertise. Chinese investments could, in fact, accelerate that transition. By rejecting Chinese investments, Beijing argues that Europe is harming itself economically, driving up energy bills for its own citizens, and jeopardizing its own climate goals.
EU is de-risking
In recent years, the EU has drastically changed its approach toward China. Whereas for years Europe focused primarily on trade and economic cooperation, it has now entered a phase of “de-risking”: reducing dependencies without completely severing trade ties.
The most talked-about issue is undoubtedly the EV import agreement. Because the EU accuses Chinese automakers, such as BYD, MG, and Geely, of artificially undercutting prices in Europe by receiving massive, prohibited state subsidies, the EU is imposing additional import duties on top of the standard 10% auto tax, ranging from 17% to 35,3% extra.
In May 2024, the EU also adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act. No more than 65% of the annual demand for a given raw material may come from a single third country. This is not a direct punitive measure against China, but it is directly aimed at Chinese dominance.
The EU has also recently announced new tariffs on certain types of Chinese steel and on biodiesel from China, again due to alleged dumping practices.
And through the “Net-Zero Industry Act,” the EU is also trying to prevent European manufacturers from being completely driven out of the market by cheap Chinese solar panels by making it easier for European manufacturers to access state aid.
Flemish or Belgian capital?
In June, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever (N-VA) also called on European leaders to develop a coherent strategy to counter what he described as China’s drive for economic domination.
And following an investigation by the General Intelligence and Security Service (ADIV), Belgium’s military intelligence agency, Flemish Member of Parliament Jasper Pillen (Anders) argued in March, during a debate with Minister-President Matthias Diependaele (N-VA), for a more active role for the Flemish Defense Fund to retain crucial expertise within the region.
The Flemish Defense Fund is tasked with pooling up to 1 billion euros in strategic capital for companies in the defense technology sector, administered through PMV (Participatiemaatschappij Vlaanderen). Diependaele subsequently acknowledged that the Defense Fund could, in theory, be used for such a purpose, but did so without specifically mentioning NHV.
Given the Belgian government’s reaction and the discussion in the Flemish Parliament about possibly using the new Defense Fund for strategic companies, the question is whether a European industrial buyer, another private-equity fund, or even Belgian public capital could step in now.
